

going there for the Underground, was arrested and tortured before being killed by the Germans.

I have just had very interesting news from Paris about the magnificent participation of the musicians in the "Resistance." During these four years I have sometimes had news from Francis Poulenc who managed to reach me by people who escaped from France and sent me a letter from Spain. He wrote about the magnificent activity of the French musicians, writing and performing for the French public. I know now that Poulenc, Louis Durey, Georges Auric and Roger Désormière were active in the Resistance. Paul Paray, the conductor of the Concerts Colonne refused to direct orchestras from which the Jews had been expelled. Claude Delvincourt was offered the post of Director of the Paris Conservatoire by the Vichy government. He accepted because he knew he could help the Resistance. He became one of the important persons of the clandestine movement in which he was known as Monsieur Julien. His office was transformed into a counterfeiting headquarters. None of the Conservatoire students was deported to Germany and during the last weeks they all enlisted in the French Forces of the Interior or in the Maquis for the battle of the liberation of Paris. During these days of fighting in the capital, Roland-Manuel was in the building of the French National Radio. He was with Manuel Rosenthal (former conductor of the Radio Orchestre National who, being a Jew, was ousted), Herman Moïens and Roland Boudariat. All around this building there were shooting, barricades, fires; at the peril of their lives, they managed to take down, by dictation through the Moscow radio, the music of the new Soviet anthem, to orchestrate it and to copy the parts so that it could be performed with the other allied national hymns at the very moment of the liberation of Paris.

Don't you think that these Frenchmen are the only ones who have the right to give a solution to this problem?

THE APPEAL TO CONSCIENCE—Ernst Krenek

THE question of what should happen to those European artists living in Nazi-dominated countries who are, or will be, accused of "collaboration" with the oppressors is so difficult to answer that it may at this point appear more useful to establish the elements that will reasonably have to enter the discussion rather than to suggest any particular solution.

It will be necessary to decide whether one should distinguish between acts of collaboration committed within the field of art and those outside of it. In regard to the latter the artist obviously should be treated like any other individual, for in all countries he is subject to the same laws as everybody else. At first sight it would not seem necessary to look upon his specific artistic activities in a different light, for they take place within the same sphere of law. However, it is commonly felt that especially the creative act in the arts involves an element of free will that distinguishes it from other activities. Nobody is obliged to write music. Not even the excuse of material necessity that performing artists may claim seems to be valid since only a few composers can live on their income as composers; nor may coercion provide a substantial alibi, for hardly anybody can be forcibly compelled to create music, since he can always plead lack of inspiration.

This would, then, lead to the next decision to be made, concerning the subjects of collaboration. Should there be a distinction between creative artists and interpreters?

Furthermore, the place of collaboration may influence the judgment. Should activities of German artists in the service of their present government be considered as a collaboration equally reprehensible, or perhaps worse than that of artists in occupied countries who have placed themselves at the disposal of the oppressors? Should the subjective opinion of the defendant as to the degree of legality of his actions be considered?

What about the time of collaboration? Should only acts committed after the outbreak of war be judged, or should the whole period from the establishment of the Nazi regime be reviewed on the assumption that anything that had strengthened that regime and weakened its victims is equally punishable? It is well known that the quislings did not begin their work after the occupation of their countries by the Nazis. In point of fact, their previous action might well be found even more treasonable than their later collaboration. The German Nazis did just as much harm before the war started as afterwards.

Finally – and this might be the most difficult part of the problem – how should the specific collaboration that transcends the sphere of commonly applicable civil and criminal law be defined? Is for instance a pianist, citizen of an occupied country, who has played in an ordinary recital guilty, because even the mere continuation of usual activities was conducive to maintaining a semblance of normality that gave aid and com-

fort to the enemy? Or was the recital rather apt to bolster the morale of the suppressed? (This is included in the broader question as to whether the actual consequences of the various acts of collaboration should be allowed to influence one's judgment.) Would our pianist be guilty only if he had accepted censorship over his program? Or if he had played for an audience of German intruders? Or if he had played in Germany? And to what amount of coercion was he exposed in any of these cases?

Still more ticklish are the problems of the composer. Should it be held against him if a performance of any of his compositions appeared desirable, or even tolerable to the Nazi authorities? Should one distinguish between compositions written before the war and those completed after the occupation? Has he written new works with a view to having them performed under the Nazi regime? Has he in his style consciously made concessions to the esthetic demands of the temporary overlords? Who is to determine such problems, and on what grounds?

Attempts to answer all these extremely difficult questions may be made along various avenues of approach. If artists would abide strictly by unequivocal standards of professional ethics, it would be easy to condemn any kind of subservience to outside authorities, and we could dismiss further inquiry into the ideas represented by such authorities. If that were the case, Palestrina, for instance, as well as Shostakovitch ought to be condemned along with our collaborationists, the one because he had complied with the rulings of the Council of Trent, the other because he has acknowledged the right of his government to impose esthetic demands upon art for political purposes. In the case of Palestrina this would seem preposterous mainly because the results of his "collaboration" are generally recognized as esthetically excellent even by those who do not share the philosophy of his sponsors. By the application of purely esthetic standards, we should not care whether or not a composition was written on Hitler's biddings or according to Goebbels' specifications, so long as it is a good composition. That does not seem feasible either, because no generally accepted esthetic standards exist in regard to contemporary music. It is for this reason that Shostakovitch's "collaboration" with the Soviet government is found unobjectionable even by many of those who are not convinced of the esthetic excellence of his works, because the philosophy of his masters seems to them at present to further their own political interests. For the rest, the exclusive application of either ethical or esthetic standards, no matter how much might be said in

its favor, implies an aloofness of art from social life that is rejected as impossible and undesirable by a majority of the artists themselves.

Therefore the answers to our questions will be sought on political grounds. This means either giving free rein to the emotional impulses involved, or calculating the consequences of the answers with respect to the order of things which appears desirable to those in a position to dictate the answers. Anyone called upon for advice will have to search his conscience: does he wish to lend his hand to the political game, or does he prefer to live by the word of the Gospel: "Judge not, that ye be not judged."

NO JUDGMENT BY PROXY—Vittorio Rieti

I AM against any intervention by American or European artists living in America, in the affairs of the artists who remained in Europe during the war, and who may now be charged with collaborationism. The problem of retribution is *their* problem, not ours. I feel sure that any expression of opinion coming from this country would bring the following reaction from overseas: "You stayed apart, now leave us alone". This we would hear both from the pro- and the anti-Germans, I believe, and they would be fully justified. Collaboration with German authorities in the artistic field, during the occupation of the various countries, has necessarily been more a question of degree than of principle. We here lack the means to discriminate between opportunism, good faith, weakness, betrayal, dignity, in every individual case. Moreover, were we in full possession of the facts, we would still be in ignorance of what would have been our own attitude in the same case. I presume that many an artist who has been living in America during the hard times feels sincerely that he would have been on the side of out-and-out resistance if he had stayed in Europe. Yet the reality might have been somewhat different.

I have recently read a great many newspapers from liberated areas containing criticisms of the American films sent to these populations in the wake of the liberating Armies. The local European reaction to the Hollywood treatment of European underground, espionage, and resistance was unanimously unfavorable, it showed irritation. Over there they simply don't want us to sit and judge from this comfortable distance. I cannot blame them.